Comparison of Methods of Organization and Management Efficiency in Dynamic Models of Cournot Oligopoly

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Abstract

Nash and Stackelberg equilibria and cooperative solutions for dynamic game-theoretic Cournot oligopoly models in normal form with inhomogeneous agents are found analytically. Cooperative game-theoretic Cournot oligopoly models of three persons in the form of the von Neumann–Morgenstern and Gromova–Petrosyan characteristic functions are studied, including the calculation of the Shapley vector. A comparative analysis of the payoffs of agents, according to the solutions obtained, is carried out for games in normal form and in the form of a characteristic function.

About the authors

A. V. Korolev

Branch of the National Research University Higher School of Economics, 190068, St. Petersburg, Russia

Email: danitschi@gmail.com
Россия, Санкт-Петербург

M. A. Kotova

Branch of the National Research University Higher School of Economics, 190068, St. Petersburg, Russia

Email: makotova_2@edu.hse.ru
Россия, Санкт-Петербург

G. A. Ugolnitsky

Southern Federal University, Rostov-on-Don, Russia

Author for correspondence.
Email: ougoln@mail.ru
Россия, Ростов-на-Дону

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